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is hard to see because much of what administrators do is hard to see, and because the 
significance of some administrative interpretations only becomes apparent over time. 
This Article expands the archive, by alerting legal scholars to fine-grained historical 
research on Americans’ encounters with administrative agencies. This body of 
work—coming largely out of history departments—is particularly attentive to the 
experiences of marginalized and non-elite populations. And although the historians 
writing in this vein have not always emphasized the constitutional aspects of their 
stories, those aspects are there between the lines. By analyzing two examples—the 
Freedmen’s Bureau’s interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment and immigration 
officials’ interpretation of the Fifth Amendment due process guarantee—this Article 
demonstrates what historians have to offer the study of administrative 
constitutionalism, both empirically and normatively. American history, this research 
reminds us, is about competing constitutional visions. Administrators helped pick 
winners and losers in an ongoing battle for formal legitimacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This symposium builds on a decade of scholarship on the role of 
administrative agencies in constructing and elaborating constitutional 
meaning—a phenomenon we now call “administrative constitutionalism.”1 
Drawing on scattered evidence from across the contemporary administrative 
state, as well as a discrete set of historical case studies, legal scholars have 
made this phenomenon visible and intelligible. Sophia Lee’s pathbreaking 
work explored the way that administrators in the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the National Labor 
Relations Board, respectively, interpreted the constitutional requirement of 
equal protection in the labor and employment arena between the 1930s and 
 
1 See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the 
Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (using the term to refer to “regulatory 
agencies’ interpretation and implementation of constitutional law”). Other scholars define the term 
differently. I employ Lee’s formulation. 
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the 1970s.2 Risa Goluboff, Anjali Dalal, and Eric Fish have separately 
examined the role of the Department of Justice in defining the scope of 
constitutional civil rights and liberties.3 Joy Milligan and I have done the 
same for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the precursor 
of what is now the Department of Education and the Department of Health 
and Human Services).4 Mining federal regulations and appellate court 
decisions, Gillian Metzger has found contemporary examples of 
administrative constitutionalism in the work of the federal Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, the Food and Drug Administration, and 
the Office of Legal Counsel.5 Other legal scholars have identified significant 
constitutional interpretations coming from the U.S. Post Office,6 the Federal 
Radio Commission,7 the Social Security Administration,8 and the War 
Department.9 And a raft of recent work illuminates how bureaucrats outside 
the federal government, at the state and local levels, have engaged questions 
of constitutional significance.10 
 
2 See id.; see also SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL 
TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014). For another example of pathbreaking early work on administrative 
constitutionalism, employing a broader understanding of the term, see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & 
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010). 
3 RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow 
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59 
(2014); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (2017). 
4 Joy Milligan, Plessy Preserved: Agencies and the Effective Constitution, YALE L.J. (forthcoming); 
Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. 847 (2018); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal 
Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 
(2015). 
5 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013). For a recent 
article that also looks at multiple agencies—including the Department of Education and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)—and focuses specifically on costs to 
constitutionally protected speech, see David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the 
Administrative State: A Skeptic’s Look at Administrative Constitutionalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1381 (2019). On administrative constitutionalism at HUD, see Blake Emerson, Affirmatively 
Furthering Equal Protection: Constitutional Meaning in the Administration of Fair Housing, 65 BUFF. L. 
REV. 163 (2017). See also Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of 
America’s Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 687, 691, 699-734 (2016) (characterizing the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act as America’s “drug constitution” and illuminating the politics that animated 
administrative interpretations of that statute in the late 1980s and 1990s). 
6 Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications 
Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553 (2007). 
7 Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the 
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 43-51 (2000). 
8 Tani, supra note 4. 
9 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1083 (2014). 
10 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 5; Marie-Amélie George, Agency Nullification: Defying Bans on 
Gay and Lesbian Foster and Adoptive Parents, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 363 (2016) (identifying 
state and local bureaucrats as important actors in the discursive shift that led ultimately to 
constitutionally recognized marriage equality for gay and lesbian citizens); Marie-Amélie George, 
 
1606 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1603 
Many of these legal scholars have also tackled normative questions, 
starting with those of greatest salience to the field of American public law: 
What does the phenomenon of administrative constitutionalism mean for a 
system of government that is democratic, federalist, and committed to 
separation of powers? In such a system, are agencies legitimate and 
appropriate interpreters of constitutional meaning?11 
This Article places that scholarship into conversation with a robust strand 
of historical research on Americans’ everyday experiences with law and 
government, including administrative agencies. Contributors to this strand 
of research—which has generally come out of history departments—display 
little interest in the questions about institutional competency and democratic 
accountability that drive many legal scholars. But through careful and creative 
archival research, they have documented administrative constitutionalism in 
action. Their findings offer legal scholars not only a broader empirical 
foundation, but also a different and important set of questions: Who has 
reaped the benefits of administrative constitutionalism and who has borne its 
burdens? How have agencies used the Constitution to shape and police the 
“borders of belonging” that have figured so crucially in American life?12 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains why historians have 
been well positioned to see administrative constitutionalism in action (even 
if they remain uninterested in it as a legal phenomenon). The two subsequent 
parts offer extended examples. Part II discusses the Freedmen’s Bureau’s 
interpretations of the terms “slavery” and “involuntary servitude”—practices 
that the Thirteenth Amendment barred but did not define. Part III turns to 
federal immigration officials’ interpretation of the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee of due process in the late nineteenth century, amidst struggles over 
Chinese immigration. Part IV concludes with a discussion of why historians’ 
questions—not simply their findings—enrich the study of administrative 
constitutionalism and one of its parent fields, administrative law. Unlike 
 
Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation of LGBT Rights, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83 
(2017) (applying an administrative constitutionalism lens to the actions of state and local bureaucrats 
grappling with the equality rights of gay and lesbian citizens); Joanna L. Grisinger, Municipal 
Administrative Constitutionalism: The New York City Commission on Human Rights, Foreign Policy, and 
the First Amendment, 167 U. PA. L. REV.  1669 (2019). 
11 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 2; Metzger, supra note 5; Bertrall L. Ross II, 
Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519 (2015). For an excellent distillation 
of what existing historical case studies offer these normative debates, see Sophia Z. Lee, From the 
History to the Theory of Administrative Constitutionalism, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE 
INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 109 (Nicholas R. Parrillo 
ed., 2017). 
12 The term “borders of belonging” comes from Barbara Welke’s scholarship on the lines of 
exclusion and inclusion that have defined citizenship in the United States. See generally BARBARA 
YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH 
CENTURY UNITED STATES (2010). 
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many scholars of administrative law, historians tend not to focus on how 
agencies should make decisions, or how much power agencies should have vis-
à-vis other governmental institutions. Their interest, rather, is how 
administrators wielded the power of the state to affect people on the 
ground—materially, politically, socially, and otherwise—and how people who 
were subject to regulation in turn affected the content and limits of 
administrative action. Historians’ work thus offers a useful reminder of the 
stakes of administrative law. These stakes include not only the legitimacy and 
jurisdiction of the so-called fourth branch but also the chances and choices of 
everyone it touches. 
I. HISTORIANS AS EXCAVATORS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A defining trait of scholarship on administrative constitutionalism, 
according to Gillian Metzger, is a “conceptual commitment to seeing 
constitutional law in ordinary law contexts.”13 When it comes to the “ordinary 
law” of administrative agencies, however, “seeing” is not so easy. Much of 
what agencies do is insulated from the broader public and unlikely to attract 
the attention of Congress, the courts, or the White House. By extension, a 
vast amount of administrative activity is not visible in the types of sources 
that legal scholars most often consult—legislative records, regulations, 
published court opinions, and the like. Further hindering visibility is the 
subtlety of some administrative interpretations of the Constitution.14 Only in 
the fullness of time does their significance become apparent.15 
All of these factors suggest the value of a historical approach, one that 
looks back on an agency’s work and recovers evidence of day-to-day 
administration. And as it turns out, historians have been doing this very work, 
albeit not with administrative constitutionalism in their sight lines. 
Importantly, many of the historians doing this work are also committed 
to the ordinary—or at least, to counterbalancing generations of prior 
scholarship that privileged elite perspectives and formal politics. They 
entered the profession when cultural history was ascendant and social history 
established; as a result, they see value in studying people whose low status or 
limited access to formal power may have prevented them from “making 
 
13 Metzger, supra note 5, at 1912. 
14 Id. at 1902. 
15 Id. at 1932; see also Lee, supra note 1, at 883 (noting that administrative constitutionalism is 
“not necessarily divulged” in the formal opinions, orders, and rules that are most accessible to legal 
scholars). On the wide range of administrative decisions that occur without triggering the 
accountability and oversight procedures that might create greater visibility, see M. Elizabeth Magill, 
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004), and Edward Rubin, It’s Time to 
Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95 (2003). 
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history” in the traditional sense.16 Under the now dominant approach to 
studying political history, what counts as politics includes much more than 
contests over political leadership, and history’s “losers” often merit as much 
attention as the “winners.”17 Legal history has long since moved in the same 
direction—beyond the mandarins of the bench and bar and toward an 
approach that emphasizes law’s messy and sometimes unpredictable 
encounters with the people it presumes to govern.18 
These trends are relevant here because they have resulted in deep and 
creative readings of the detritus of administrative agencies—including from 
time periods that predate the modern administrative state (as conventionally 
understood).19 Historian Gautham Rao, for example, has mined the day-to-
day records of custom houses in the early national period to illuminate the 
waxing and waning of distinct visions of governance.20 Historian Cathleen 
Cahill has used the archives of the U.S. Indian Service to provide a revisionist 
account of the modern administrative state itself, pegging its origins not to 
Gilded Age railroad regulation or to the New Deal but to an older project of 
settler colonialism.21 
Twentieth-century regulatory innovations have provided even richer 
fodder for historians. Margot Canaday has drawn on records from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Selective Service System, and 
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, among many other agencies, 
to show how contemporary understandings of homosexuality took shape and 
how the label “homosexual” came to signal the citizen’s quintessential 
 
16 For a brisk summary of major trends in historical writing across the twentieth century, 
including the rise of social and cultural history, see Sean Wilentz, American Political Histories, 21 
OAH MAG. HIST. 23 (2007). 
17 See generally THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003). 
18 On these general trends, see William E. Forbath, Hendrik Hartog & Martha Minow, 
Introduction: Legal Histories from Below, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 759; Robert W. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst 
and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 9 (1975); and 
Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights Historiography, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2013) 
(reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAWYER (2012)). 
19 Some of the people I have described as legal scholars are also first-rate historians. Situated 
in law schools, they are nonetheless in dialogue with professional historians and deeply committed 
to the methods of the discipline. The historical work that I draw from in this Article comes primarily 
from historians who have made their institutional home in history departments and, for the most 
part, lack formal legal training. 
20 GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN STATE (2016). 
21 CATHLEEN D. CAHILL, FEDERAL FATHERS AND MOTHERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES INDIAN SERVICE, 1869–1933 (2011). Political scientist Stephen Rockwell has 
advanced a similar argument. STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010). 
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“other.”22 Michael Willrich used the records of Chicago’s agency-like 
municipal courts to explore Progressive-Era tactics for governing poor and 
working-class Americans.23 From the records of the federal Office of War 
Information, among other agencies, James Sparrow documented how 
Americans grew acclimated to a much more visible and powerful federal 
government during and after World War II.24 Studying the military as a 
bureaucracy (specifically, the military chaplaincy), Ronit Stahl has shown how 
the modern American state managed religious pluralism and, over time, built 
“state-sponsored American religion.”25 The list could continue.26 These 
scholars might not describe their work as histories of administrative 
governance, and yet that is what they have illuminated, in fine-grained detail.27 
 
22 MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009). For a fuller account of the many agencies and 
bureaucratic actors that have regulated sex and sexuality in U.S. history, see Melissa Murray & 
Karen Tani, Something Old, Something New: Reflections on the Sex Bureaucracy, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 
ONLINE 122, 127-40 (2016). 
23 MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA 
CHICAGO (2003). 
24 JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF 
BIG GOVERNMENT (2011). 
25 RONIT Y. STAHL, ENLISTING FAITH: HOW THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY SHAPED 
RELIGION AND STATE IN MODERN AMERICA 14 (2017). 
26 Scholars of Native history, immigration history, social welfare history, and civil rights 
history have made especially effective and creative use of administrative records. For Native history, 
see, for example, CAHILL, supra note 21; CHRISTOPHER D. HAVEMAN, RIVERS OF SAND: CREEK 
INDIAN EMIGRATION, RELOCATION, AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
(2016); and MARGARET D. JACOBS, WHITE MOTHER TO A DARK RACE: SETTLER 
COLONIALISM, MATERNALISM, AND THE REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST AND AUSTRALIA, 1880–1940 (2009). For immigration history, see, for example, 
CANADAY, supra note 22; S. DEBORAH KANG, THE INS ON THE LINE: MAKING U.S. 
IMMIGRATION LAW ON THE US-MEXICO BORDER, 1917–1954 (2017); ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S 
GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 (2003); DEIRDRE M. 
MOLONEY, NATIONAL INSECURITIES: IMMIGRANTS AND U.S. DEPORTATION POLICY SINCE 
1882 (2012); MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA (2004); and LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). For work on welfare 
bureaucracy, see, for example, FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: 
POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007); LISA LEVENSTEIN, A MOVEMENT 
WITHOUT MARCHES: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF POVERTY IN 
POSTWAR PHILADELPHIA (2009); and KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, 
RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972 (2016). For work on the bureaucracy of civil 
rights enforcement and its obverse, the bureaucracy of segregation, see, for example, GOLUBOFF, 
supra note 3; LEE, supra note 2; PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION 
LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009); and KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON 
TRIAL: GENDER AND RIGHTS IN THE MODERN AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2016). 
27 This Article foregrounds historical work, but I would be remiss if I did not mention social 
science research that draws on administrative records and implicates constitutionally protected 
rights and values. See, e.g., Jennifer Carlson, The Hidden Arm of the Law: Examining Administrative 
Justice in Gun Carrying Licensing, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 346 (2017) (analyzing the workings and 
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In some cases, historians have also illuminated administrative interpretations 
of the Constitution—albeit without naming those interpretations as such. The 
subsequent Parts offer two dramatic and consequential examples. Taken 
together, these examples showcase the raw material that historians have to 
offer legal scholars, as well as the normative value of engaging with their 
findings. Recovering the experiences of marginalized and non-elite people, 
many now long dead, might not lead to any particular policy prescription for 
the present-day administrative state, but it foregrounds the human stakes. 
II. THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE MEANING OF  
“INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE” 
A natural starting point for this exercise is the Civil War: In the wake of 
that great conflict, the legal landscape changed dramatically (even if on the 
ground, much remained the same). A fundamental feature of this new 
landscape was the Thirteenth Amendment, passed by the Republican-
dominated U.S. Congress on January 31, 1865, and ratified the following 
December. The amendment abolished both slavery and “involuntary 
servitude” throughout the United States, “except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”28 
In one sense, the meaning of these words was plain. The institution of 
slavery was dead. Emancipation was no longer a matter of politics or wartime 
strategy, but of formal constitutional law. In another sense, however, these words 
were ambiguous. What conditions amounted to “involuntary servitude”?29 It 
 
decisions of county-level gun boards); Vicki Lens et al., Choreographing Justice: Administrative Law 
Judges and the Management of Welfare Disputes, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 199 (2013) (analyzing administrative 
“fair hearings” in the welfare context); Keramet Reiter, Reclaiming the Power to Punish: Legislating and 
Administrating the California Supermax, 1982–1989, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 484 (2016) (drawing on 
interviews with prison administrators, among other sources). 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
29 Many works of legal scholarship have attempted to discern what the framers of the 
Amendment meant by “involuntary servitude.” See, e.g., JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK: 
LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1815–1880, at 116-17 (1998) (arguing that 
the drafters likely understood the “involuntary servitude” clause as a guarantee that workers would 
“be free to choose individual employers” and that “negotiations over remuneration and conditions 
of employment” would “be unfettered”); Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2020, 2024, 2065-66 (2009) (arguing that to the framers, the term 
likely had a relatively clear meaning, based on “more than seventy years of legal practice,” but also 
noting that the term received “very little attention” during congressional debates and that 
“revolutionary aspirations” were in the air); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 448-50, 452-53 (1989) (noting a range of views among the 
framers and arguing that Congress did not give “substance and meaning to the term ‘involuntary 
servitude’ [until] after passing the amendment,” because the term could really only be defined “in 
the context of the post-slavery state”); see also Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional Politics, 
Constitutional Law, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 163, 187 (2011) (“Exactly what 
freedom meant was an argument for another day.”); James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom 
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would be nearly two decades before the Supreme Court handed down the 
“badges and incidents” language familiar to us today30 (and even that 
language is ambiguous).31 One thing was clear, however: Given the vast 
inequalities of power between formerly enslaved people and those who had 
enslaved them, as well as between wage laborers and employers more generally, 
the precise content of the Thirteenth Amendment was a pressing question. 
The answer, in the first instance, came neither from Congress nor from 
the courts,32 but from a new administrative agency, housed within the War 
Department: the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—
commonly known as the Freedmen’s Bureau.33 Established by Congress on 
March 3, 1865, the Freedmen’s Bureau was in charge of managing all the lands 
that were confiscated, captured, or abandoned during the war.34 Congress also 
 
of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1481-87, 1491 (2010) 
(arguing that there was no consensus among the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment regarding 
whether it protected “the right to quit”). A related but distinct question was what the bounds were 
of Congress’s authority under the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII, § 2 (giving Congress the “power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation”). 
30 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (holding that § 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment empowered Congress “to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges 
and incidents of slavery in the United States”). On whether § 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
directly bans the “badges and incidents of slavery,” see James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 65 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 426 (2018). 
31 See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 J. CONST. L. 
561, 564 (2012) (noting that, despite post-1883 elaborations of the badges-and-incidents phrase, there 
remains “no generally accepted understanding as to [its] meaning”); see also Pope, supra note 30, at 
465-69, 477 (suggesting that a search for the framers’ understanding of “badges and incidents” would 
surface general agreement on the core incidents of slavery, but, beyond that, partisan disagreement). 
32 Congress’s first pronouncements about the meanings of “slavery” and “involuntary 
servitude” were the Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866 and the Peonage Act of 1867. Neither Act, 
however, purported to identify the outer bounds of these phrases. Early judicial opinions on this 
issue were scarce. One of the earliest was In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (Chase, 
C.J.), discussed infra at notes 86-100 and the accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s earliest 
elaboration of the term “involuntary servitude” did not occur until 1872, in the Slaughter-House Cases, 
83 U.S. 36, 49 (1872). The relative silence of the courts in these early years is consistent with Michael 
Les Benedict’s argument that “when Congress proposed and the state legislatures ratified the 
Thirteenth Amendment, they did not conceive that the courts would be the primary agency that 
would enforce it.” Benedict, supra note 29, at 176. 
33 On the Freedmen’s Bureau as one of the nation’s first administrative agencies, albeit one that 
has not received much attention from legal scholars, see SCHMIDT, supra note 29. Schmidt also 
notes the role of Bureau agents in giving life to the Thirteenth Amendment: “[I]n the months and 
years after passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,” they “would attempt . . . to transform its promises 
into realities.” Id. at 121. On the Freedmen’s Bureau’s role in answering other vital questions, such as 
the legitimacy of freed persons’ family arrangements, see TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN WEDLOCK: 
SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 233-44 (2017); AMY DRU 
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE 
AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 44-46 (1998); and Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: 
Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 279-90 (1999). 
34 Randall M. Miller, Introduction, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: 
RECONSIDERATIONS xiii, xv (Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds., 1999). 
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gave the Bureau the broad and demanding task of handling all issues relating 
to refugees and freed persons.35 At a time when local and state governments 
remained hostile to black interests, and when state-level Bureau 
commissioners and their local appointees “often constituted the only federal 
presence in much of the South,” this authority was significant.36 “For newly 
freed blacks,” historian Randall Miller has summarized, the Bureau was very 
simply “‘the government.’”37 
That the Bureau’s work would so directly implicate the Thirteenth 
Amendment was not obvious at the agency’s birth, but Reconstruction 
politics quickly forced the issue. President Andrew Johnson’s generous pardon 
policies effectively precluded Bureau officials from redistributing land 
(because after being pardoned, former slave owners were able to recover their 
land).38 This, in turn, meant that formerly enslaved people had little choice 
but to work on plantations and farms. Their prospective employers, 
meanwhile, were eager for their labor, but not accustomed to paying for it, 
nor were they inclined to honor the rights and privileges that many black 
workers now demanded.39 
In this context, Bureau agents became crucial brokers and adjudicators.40 
Their everyday decisions—about what kind of labor arrangements were fair 
and what kind of agreements were binding—helped draw a line between labor 




37 Id. Among historians, interest in the Freedmen’s Bureau has surged over the last four 
decades. Robert Harrison, New Representations of a ‘Misrepresented Bureau’: Reflections on Recent 
Scholarship on the Freedmen’s Bureau, 8 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 205, 205 (2007); see 
generally id. (giving a historiographical overview of writing on the Freedmen’s Bureau). See also 
MARY FARMER-KAISER, THE FREEDWOMEN AND THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: RACE, GENDER, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 1-10 (2010). 
38 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 
159-61 (1988). 
39 Id.; DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 
AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865–1868, at xvi (1979). For a detailed examination of the 
importance of land to escaping conditions of servitude, see generally CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY 
ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP (1978). 
40 See James D. Schmidt, “A Full-Fledged Government of Men”: Freedmen’s Bureau Labor Policy in 
South Carolina, 1865–1868, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: 
RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 34, at 219, 221 (explaining that when it came to “the legal 
boundaries of the employment relation,” local agents of the Bureau “opened some options and closed 
others”); see also CHRISTOPHER B. BEAN, TOO GREAT A BURDEN TO BEAR: THE STRUGGLE AND 
FAILURE OF THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU IN TEXAS 34 (2016) (noting that the Freedmen’s Bureau 
“could have been easily called the Labor Bureau” and that its agents were sometimes referred to as 
“employment agents”). A description of the type of people who became Bureau agents and how they 
tended to approach their work also appears in James Schmidt and Christopher B. Bean’s respective 
works cited above. See also FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 16-24 (providing another overview of 
the kinds of people who worked for the Bureau). 
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that, while perhaps coercive and unequal, were not unconstitutional.41 This 
line was never perfectly clean and sharp, given the lack of uniformity in 
Bureau decisionmaking, but it mattered. When legislatures and judges later 
attempted to give content to the Thirteenth Amendment’s promises, I explain 
below, they did so against this backdrop. And, of course, for people on the 
ground, the Bureau was often the last stop on their journey toward 
constitutional vindication. 
Crucial to my argument is the fact that many freed people were deeply 
suspicious of labor contracts, equating them, in the words of one Union 
officer, with “a practical return to slavery.”42 Some freed people also retained 
hope of farming on their own account and saw no need to commit themselves 
to low-paying, closely supervised labor.43 In the face of these preferences, 
Bureau officials often insisted that freed persons enter contracts and 
undermined efforts to pursue alternative, non-contractual arrangements. 
Historical accounts are filled with examples. Consider Bureau assistant 
commissioner Thomas Osborn’s response in early 1866 to reports of 
underemployed freedmen in Jacksonville, Florida (the men apparently 
refused to work for local planters): Osborn ordered the men shipped by rail 
to Tallahassee, to labor under contracts that Osborn would draw up for 
them.44 In Arkansas, the assistant commissioner did not himself issue such 
directives, but “sometimes winked at agents’ use of heavy-handed methods.”45 
In Virginia, assistant commissioner Orlando Brown ordered his agents to 
 
41 A similar argument might be made regarding federal military officers stationed at territorial 
outposts and parts of the postwar South. Historian Stacey L. Smith documented an instance in 
August 1865 in which a resident of New Mexico territory asked for federal assistance in capturing a 
“peon” who had fled his service and the federal officer refused, claiming that returning a fugitive 
debtor to his master would be “contrary to the established rules and regulations of the government 
under which we live.” A superior officer subsequently reversed that decision, reasoning that 
“[p]eonage is voluntary and not involuntary servitude.” Stacey L. Smith, Emancipating Peons, 
Excluding Coolies: Reconstructing Coercion in the American West, in THE WORLD THE CIVIL WAR 
MADE 46, 53-54 (Gregory P. Downs & Kate Masur eds., 2015). Historian Leslie Schwalm has 
pointed out that in 1865, in lowcountry South Carolina, military authorities had a larger role than 
the Freedmen’s Bureau in “instituting and enforcing the contract labor system.” LESLIE A. 
SCHWALM, A HARD FIGHT FOR WE: WOMEN’S TRANSITION FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM IN 
SOUTH CAROLINA 171 (1997); see also DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK 
FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY 12 (documenting the role of the Union Army in forcing formerly 
enslaved people into labor contracts in 1865). 
42 FONER, supra note 38, at 161; see also STANLEY, supra note 33, at 40-42 (noting freedpeople’s 
aversion to labor contracts and deep distrust of white employers). 
43 STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE 
RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 153 (2003); see also Eric Foner, Rights 
and the Constitution in Black Life during the Civil War, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 871 (1987) (noting that 
“[n]umerous freedmen emerged from slavery convinced they had a ‘right’ to a portion of their former 
owners’ land”). 
44 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 164. 
45 Id. 
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arrest freedmen who refused to accept fair offers of employment and force 
those freedmen to labor without compensation on public works.46 The same 
threat was implicit in Alabama and Mississippi, where agents reminded 
freedmen that if they did not enter contracts, they would be treated as 
vagrants under local law—with all the penalties that attached to that status.47 
In South Carolina, agents helped evict black laborers who were “squatt[ing]” 
on the plantations where they had worked in 1865; those laborers had hoped 
to convince planters to rent them land for the 1866 season, but when faced 
with eviction, they often acquiesced to less desirable wage or share 
contracts.48 This is not to say that Bureau tactics were always so coercive, 
because they were not. The point is that Bureau agents strongly encouraged 
freed persons—especially men—to enter labor contracts, in a context in which 
the balance of power favored employers and in which many employers were 
eager to replicate the conditions of slavery. 
Simultaneously, Bureau agents failed to support viable alternatives to the 
contract labor system. Plausible alternatives for freed persons included 
working without contracts, or, with help from Bureau officials, demanding 
that landowners rent them land. Bureau leaders rejected these 
alternatives.49 The Bureau might also have offered freed persons direct 
economic support, so that they did not feel compelled to enter labor 
agreements that replicated the conditions of slavery. Bureau agents 
sometimes provided such support to women, historian Mary J. Farmer has 
shown, but they excluded men, as part of an overarching “war on 
dependency.”50 Facilitating labor contracts was the norm. 
In many locations Bureau agents reviewed the contracts and even 
provided the terms. Assistant commissioners “stipulated that the Bureau 
would recognize as legitimate only written contracts that were fair to 
employees” (with fairness a matter for Bureau officials to decide), historian 
Donald Nieman summarizes, and they “strongly recommended that parties 
have their contracts approved by agents.”51 Employers had an incentive to 
 
46 Id. at 165. 
47 Id. at 166-67 (Alabama); id. at 164-65 (Mississippi); NOVAK, supra note 41, at 11 (Mississippi). 
48 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 167-69. 
49 Id. at 156-59; SCHWALM, supra note 41, at 226-31. 
50 Mary J. Farmer, “Because They Are Women’: Gender and the Virginia Freedmen’s Bureau’s ‘War on 
Dependency,” in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS, supra 
note 34, at 161, 162-63; see also Robert Harrison, Welfare and Employment Policies of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau in the District of Columbia, 72 J.S. HIST. 75, 89 (2006) (describing the “rigorously spartan form 
of benevolence advocated by the bureau”); JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN ILLNESS AND SUFFERING DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (2012) 
(showing how concerns about dependency constrained the Freedmen’s Bureau’s response to 
disability and disease among freed people). 
51 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 163. 
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submit to this process because, at least in 1865, it seemed likely that a Bureau 
agent would adjudicate any kind of contract dispute that might arise. When 
the Bureau began its work, many states in the former Confederacy still did 
not allow African Americans to testify in court, leading to the creation of a 
system of Freedmen’s Bureau courts for civil disputes.52 State courts in the 
South had regained control over these disputes by the fall of 1866, but Bureau 
agents continued to assert jurisdiction as needed.53 In this institutional 
context, many employers actually did submit their contracts for Bureau 
approval and conform their agreements to Bureau baselines.54 
In some regards, freed persons appeared to benefit from the Bureau’s 
influence, gaining guarantees that differentiated post-emancipation labor 
from slavery. For example, some Bureau officials set wage floors and insisted 
that planters disclaim the right to use physical coercion.55 In the sugar region 
of Louisiana, Bureau regulations expressly urged freed persons to “obtain the 
best terms they can for their service” and insisted that in addition to wages, 
freed persons receive such basic necessities as food, clothing, housing, and 
medical attention.56 
Bureau officials took no exception, however, to other contract terms that, 
in practice, maintained formerly enslaved people in nearly the exact 
conditions they had ostensibly escaped. As historian Eric Foner notes, 
“[s]ome Bureau officers approved agreements in which the laborer would 
receive nothing at all if the crop failed and could incur fines for such vaguely 
defined offenses as failure to do satisfactory work or ‘imprudent, profane or 
indecent language.’”57 And many Bureau-approved contracts provided for 
postponement of payment until the crop had been harvested and sold. Such 
a “practice not only left share workers penniless in the event of a poor crop,” 
Foner explains, “but offered numerous opportunities for fraud on the part of 
planters,” including charges for rations that exceeded the wages owed and 
deductions from wages for poor work or other infractions.58 Under the terms 
of many contracts, such infractions could include possessing “deadly weapons” 
or “ardent spirits,” having visitors or leaving the plantation without permission, 
 
52 See James Oakes, A Failure of Vision: The Collapse of the Freedmen’s Bureau Courts, 25 CIVIL 
WAR HIST. 66, 68 (1979). 
53 Id. at 70-73. 
54 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 163; Julie Novkov, Making Citizens of Freedmen and Polygamists, in 
STATEBUILDING FROM THE MARGINS: BETWEEN RECONSTRUCTION AND THE NEW DEAL 32, 
37-38 (Carol Nackenoff & Julie Novkov eds., 2014). 
55 FONER, supra note 38, at 165; NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 165; Sara Rapport, The Freedmen’s 
Bureau as a Legal Agent for Black Men and Women in Georgia: 1865–1868, 73 GA. HIST. Q. 26, 32 (1989). 
56 John C. Rodrigue, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Wage Labor in the Louisiana Sugar Region, in THE 
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 193, 199. 
57 FONER, supra note 38, at 165. 
58 Id. at 172. 
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denying the employer entry into the freedman’s cabin, or rendering anything 
less than “perfect obedience.”59 Such terms were in clear contradiction to what 
historian Tera Hunter has called African Americans’ “guiding assumption” 
during this era: “that wage labor should not emulate slavery.”60 
Had freed persons been able to cut their losses and walk away, the effect 
of such contract provisions would not have been as harsh, but planters were 
determined to foreclose that option and the Bureau placed few obstacles in 
their path. In 1865 and 1866, state legislatures throughout the South made 
violation of a labor contract a crime; planters then turned to the Freedmen’s 
Bureau for assistance in compelling specific performance.61 The Bureau’s 
response is another example of the sometimes subtle ways in which this 
agency gave meaning to the fledgling Thirteenth Amendment. Some assistant 
commissioners ordered freed persons to finish out their contracts or 
incentivized them to do so with the threat of imprisonment or forced labor.62 
These actions are noteworthy, for as legal scholar Lea VanderVelde has 
argued, a plausible interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment—consistent 
with Radical Republican ideology—was that it banned specific performance 
of labor contracts.63 Other assistant commissioners declined to compel 
specific performance, especially after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, but still did less than they might have to support workers who 
abandoned exploitive employers.64 
The “‘compulsory’ system of ‘free’ labor”65 that the Bureau helped 
establish has prompted searching questions from historians. In Eric Foner’s 
words, “how ‘voluntary’ were labor contracts agreed to by blacks when they 
were denied access to land, coerced by troops and Bureau agents if they refused 
to sign, and fined or imprisoned if they struck for higher wages?”66 Foner 
 
59 LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 409 
(1979); see also HANNAH ROSEN, TERROR IN THE HEART OF FREEDOM: CITIZENSHIP, SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE, AND THE MEANING OF RACE IN THE POSTEMANCIPATION SOUTH 42 (2009) (noting 
that in 1865, a Bureau official in the Memphis area enhanced contractual restrictions on mobility by 
forbidding “ferrymen from transporting freedpeople across the Mississippi River from Arkansas 
into Memphis unless the prospective passengers carried a note from their employer authorizing 
their travels”). 
60 TERA W. HUNTER, TO ’JOY MY FREEDOM: SOUTHERN BLACK WOMEN’S LIVES AND 
LABORS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 27 (1997). 
61 NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 173. 
62 Id. at 173-76; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 128 (describing how an assistant 
commissioner in Texas fined planters who enticed laborers to break Bureau-approved contracts, as 
well as laborers who “allowed themselves to be enticed,” thereby “reviv[ing] a part of labor contract 
law long since dead” in the United States). 
63 VanderVelde, supra note 29, at 489-90. 
64 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 76, 88-89; NIEMAN, supra note 39, at 173-76. 
65 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 81. 
66 FONER, supra note 38, at 166. 
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posed this question in order to probe the Bureau’s commitment to the 
principles of free labor, an ideology that helped inspire the Civil War and that 
animated the project of Reconstruction. But his question also brings into focus 
the concern of this Article: the Bureau’s witting or unwitting interpretation of 
the Constitution. Bureau agents, by their actions and inactions, signaled that 
certain labor arrangements did not amount to “involuntary servitude,” despite 
ample indication that freed people felt otherwise. 
Strong statements about the import of the Bureau’s constitutional 
interpretations must await more research, keyed specifically to this question, 
but at a minimum, the existing secondary literature suggests that these 
interpretations had two lines of influence, one that ran through Congress and 
the other that ran through the judiciary. 
On the first: In the months after ratification, Congress was still 
considering how to wield its enforcement authority under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and Bureau agents provided eyes and ears on the ground. 
Senator Henry Wilson (a Republican from Massachusetts), for example, 
referenced the work of the Freedmen’s Bureau when attempting to convince 
his fellow Congressmen to annul state “black codes” that required employees 
to forfeit all wages if they quit before the end of the contract term.67 
Considered “odious” by the Freedmen’s Bureau, such laws surely merited the 
attention of Congress, Wilson argued.68 By extension, the Bureau’s tolerance 
of other coercive labor practices could well have sent the opposite message: 
that such practices were not worthy of Congress’s attention, or were perhaps 
even beyond its purview. The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 is noteworthy here. In 
enacting this law, Congress clarified that the labor system “known as peonage” 
was unlawful; attempts to “establish, maintain, or enforce” that system were 
punishable by fine and imprisonment.69 But the Act declined to define 
“peonage” broadly (indeed, declined to define it at all, other than by reference 
to the coercive, debt-based labor system that then existed in New Mexico 
territory) and was silent as to a range of other exploitative labor practices.70 
On the second line of influence, running through the courts: taken 
cumulatively, the Bureau’s actions suggested a relatively restrictive reading of 
the phrases “slavery” and “involuntary servitude.” Indeed, the Bureau’s 
interpretations are consistent with a narrative in which, in the span of a few 
decades, the courts squeezed out more capacious understandings of these 
 
67 VanderVelde, supra note 29, at 462, 488, 492-93. 
68 Id. at 493. For further evidence that members of Congress read and relied upon reports from 
the Freedmen’s Bureau, see ROSEN, supra note 59, at 76, and Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an 
Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction Congresses, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 315, 341 (2000). 
69 Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867). 
70 Id. 
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terms. In cases such as the Slaughter-House Cases71 and the Civil Rights Cases,72 
litigants pushed for expansive interpretations of the Thirteenth 
Amendment—ones that might guarantee “the rights of every man to the 
fruits of his own labor” or authorize broad antidiscrimination legislation.73 
The Court responded by anchoring the amendment’s meaning in the “shades 
and conditions,” or “badges and incidents,” of racialized slavery,74 terms that, 
in turn, took meaning from the Court’s invocation of classic master-and-
servant-type controls: “compuls[ion],” “restraint,” and legal “disability.”75 
There is, however, at least one early case—regarding the indenture of 
freed children—in which Bureau agents adopted a more generous reading of 
the Thirteenth Amendment and invited an influential federal court judge to 
do the same. This case thus provides an interesting twist to the story above. 
Here, Bureau officials’ constitutional interpretation overlapped substantially 
with that of their charges. 
“As soon as blacks became free,” summarizes historian Barry Crouch, 
“whites moved with dispatch to apprentice black children.”76 In doing so, they 
relied on familiar tactics of coercion and manipulation, as well as new state 
laws (part and parcel of the infamous Black Codes) created to assist planters 
in reclaiming the labor of freed children. Often these statutes used the 
seemingly benign language of stewardship, allowing former slave owners to 
become the legal guardians of orphaned black youth, or of youth whose 
parents failed to demonstrate industry and good habits.77 Other statutes 
created mechanisms for identifying such children, by giving local magistrates 
 
71 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
72 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
73 Brief for Plaintiffs on History, Object, Aim and Intent of the 13th, 14th and 15th 
Amendments, and of Contemporaneous Legislation, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
36 (1872) (No. 61), 1872 WL 15120, at *8-9. 
74 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-21. 
75 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. Justice Harlan’s dissent offers a glimpse of a different 
interpretive path. See id. at 33-38 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment “is not necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution 
upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the liberated race 
against discrimination in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen where such discrimination is 
based upon race”). 
76 Barry A. Crouch, ‘To Enslave the Rising Generation’: The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Texas Black 
Code, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 
34, at 262, 267. 
77 See, e.g., Apprentice Law of Mississippi, 1865, reprinted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL 
FINKELMAN, 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 461 (2d ed. 
2002) (making it the duty of civil officers to report to the probate court “all freedmen, free negroes, 
and mulattoes, under the age of eighteen . . . who are orphans, or whose parent or parents have not 
the means or who refuse to provide for and support” them, and making it the duty of the probate 
court to order that the minors be “apprentice[d] . . . to some competent and suitable person,” with 
priority given to the “former owner of said minors”). 
 
2019] Administrative Constitutionalism at the Borders of Belonging 1619 
the power to seize freed children and assess whether their parents were 
capable and suitable. Once bound out, children could expect to labor for their 
“guardians” until they reached adulthood.78 
Freed persons, especially freedwomen, routinely called on the Bureau to 
release young relatives from such arrangements. In doing so, historian Mary 
Farmer-Kaiser has argued, freedwomen advanced their own understanding of 
freedom—one that included the reestablishment of their families and the right 
to control their children’s labor. To be “free ourselves but deprived of our 
children,” explained freedwoman Lucy Lee, was only a small improvement 
over slavery.79 Their many complaints seem to have helped Bureau agents see 
the evils of so-called apprenticeships. The practice “fosters the old ideas of 
compulsory labor and dependence,” observed a Bureau agent in North Carolina 
in early 1866.80 It was a “system of slavery,” masquerading behind the unfulfilled 
promise of care and tutelage, agreed a Mississippi agent.81 
This is not to say that Bureau agents never supported apprenticeship 
arrangements, for in fact, they sometimes did—generally in cases involving 
the children of poor, single mothers, and generally on the condition that 
guardians provide a minimum level of education and service.82 In some cases, 
Bureau agents themselves approved the apprenticeship contracts.83 In other 
cases, however, Bureau agents stood up to planters, at personal peril, and 
disallowed or voided indenture agreements. In some jurisdictions, they also 
sought to make examples of prominent guardians by aiding freed persons 
when they pursued their interests in court.84 There, they helped establish that 
some indenture agreements, at least, violated the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 
78 See generally id.; Rebecca J. Scott, The Battle over the Child: Child Apprenticeship and the Freedmen’s 
Bureau in North Carolina, in GROWING UP IN AMERICA: CHILDREN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
193, 193-98 (N. Ray Hiner & Joseph M. Hawes eds., 1985); see also FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 
99-100; KARIN L. ZIPF, LABOR OF INNOCENTS: FORCED APPRENTICESHIP IN NORTH CAROLINA, 
1715–1919, at 40-83 (2005); Richard Paul Fuke, Planters, Apprenticeship, and Forced Labor: The Black Family 
Under Pressure in Post-Emancipation Maryland, 62 AGRIC. HIST. 57, 62-68 (1988); J. Michael Rhyne, 
“Conduct . . . Inexcusable and Unjustifiable”: Bound Children, Battered Freedwomen, and the Limits of 
Emancipation in Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region, 42 J. SOC. HIST. 319, 324 (2008). 
79 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 139-40 (quoting Lee as saying, “[O]ur condition is 
bettered but little”). 
80 Id. at 57. 
81 Id. at 105; see also id. at 104-06 (collecting a number of similar observations); id. at 121-22 
(describing agents’ efforts to assist two mothers in reclaiming their children from indenture). 
82 Id. at 108-18, 128-29; see also Scott, supra note 78, at 199-204 (describing the “case-by-case 
judgments” Bureau agents made in these circumstances). 
83 ZIPF, supra note 78, at 80 (noting that Freedmen’s Bureau agents in North Carolina 
apprenticed hundreds of children, including in cases where there was no parental consent). 
84 FARMER-KAISER, supra note 37, at 108, 121-26; see also Crouch, supra note 76, at 270-71 
(describing the efforts of some Bureau agents to “oppose[] binding as a county policy and opposing 
the binding out of individual children); cf. SCHWALM, supra note 41, at 252-54 (documenting the 
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The habeas corpus case In re Turner, decided by a federal circuit court in 
Baltimore, Maryland, in 1867, testifies to the Bureau’s influence.85 The case 
involved a young woman, Elizabeth Turner, who had been apprenticed to her 
former owner a mere two days after the abolition of slavery.86 In keeping with 
Maryland’s new apprenticeship statute, the indenture contract for Turner 
bore little resemblance to the contracts required for white children: Whereas 
white children were to receive education in reading, writing, and arithmetic, 
Turner had no such guarantees; her education would be in “the art or calling 
of a house servant.”87 And unlike contracts for white children, Turner’s 
allowed her to be “transferred at the will of [her] master to any person in the 
same county.”88 With the assistance of two Freedmen’s Bureau lawyers, Henry 
Stockbridge and Nathan Pusey, Turner’s family sought her release.89 
According to historian W. Augustus Low, Stockbridge’s appointment to 
the Bureau was specifically “to aid . . . in its fight against the apprentice 
system.”90 Stockbridge was a Radical Republican who, as early as May 1865, 
had sought the aid of state courts in releasing black children from these 
coerced contracts of service.91 In Turner’s case, where Stockbridge at last had 
an audience with a federal judge, he took a strong stand.92 This sort of 
apprenticeship was “an evasion of the constitutional amendment abolishing 
slavery and involuntary servitude,” he argued to the presiding judge, U.S. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase. 93 He also reminded the Chief 
Justice that “the [C]onstitution by its own powers executes itself,” signaling 
that a favorable decision need not rest on the 1866 Civil Rights Act.94 
Hardly a friend to slavery, Chief Justice Chase likely did not require much 
convincing.95 In a case of first impression, he accepted Stockbridge’s 
invitation and declared Turner’s apprenticeship “involuntary servitude, 
 
“usual[]” rule that “unless ‘improper treatment’ could be proven . . .  , apprenticeships would stand,” 
but also noting other, conflicting instructions that Bureau officials received). 
85 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (Chase, C.J.). 
86 HAROLD M. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE 
TURNER AND TEXAS V. WHITE 120, 124-29 (1997). 
87 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 338 (describing the parties’ arguments in the case synopsis). 
88 Id. at 339. 
89 Id. at 338. 
90 W. A. Low, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights in Maryland, 37 J. NEGRO HIST. 221, 
228 (1952). 
91 Fuke, supra note 78, at 72. 
92 See id. (noting that prior to the Turner case, Bureau agents in Maryland had “flooded state 
courts with applications for writs of habeas corpus” and been rebuffed; Chief Justice Chase’s 
agreement to hear the Turner case while on federal circuit duty offered a new and important 
opportunity). 
93 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339 (case synopsis). 
94 Id. 
95 See generally JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY (1995) (describing Chase’s 
long career as an opponent of slavery). 
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within the meaning of these words in the [Thirteenth] [A]mendment.”96 As 
a result, he determined, Turner must be released.97 
In the short term, the Turner decision was of modest value to freed people. 
It was an important statement of law, but enforcement required resources, 
institutional capacity, and political will, all of which were in short supply in the 
late 1860s. Maryland’s legally “moribund” apprenticeship system lingered on 
for years.98 
And yet In re Turner remains a landmark in constitutional law. In historian 
Risa Goluboff ’s words, it is a reminder of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
“expansive possibilities for establishing freedom and equality”99—even as, in 
the words of another scholar, the Amendment’s judicially recognized meaning 
“has shrunk to the size of an antebellum grave marker.”100 Administrators 
from the Freedmen’s Bureau are implicated in both facets of this history. 
III. CHINESE INSPECTORS AND THE MEANING OF DUE PROCESS 
As Americans in former slaveholding states adjusted to the demise of the 
legal institution of slavery and the reality of emancipation, those in the West 
were also engaged in tense negotiations over race, citizenship, and nation—
negotiations that offer another example of administrative constitutionalism 
in action. 
As in the South, race and labor were central, but the conflict in the West 
stemmed from a different complex of factors: post–“Gold Rush” population 
growth, including tens of thousands of immigrants from China; powerful 
ideologies of white, Anglo-Saxon superiority and Asian inferiority; and, by 
the early 1870s, a scarcity of jobs for unskilled laborers. Western nativists and 
labor organizations pressured Congress to address what they called the 
“Chinese problem,” resulting in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.101 The 
Act suspended immigration of Chinese laborers, imposed criminal penalties 
on those who aided or abetted such immigration, and prohibited Chinese 
 
96 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
97 Id.; HYMAN, supra note 86, at 120, 128-29. 
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immigrants already in the country from obtaining U.S. citizenship.102 A series 
of follow-on laws, such as the Geary Act of 1892, extended and reinforced the 
exclusionist project.103 
Federal administrators were primarily in charge of enforcing Chinese 
exclusion, first under the auspices of the U.S. Customs Service (within the 
Treasury Department) and then, after 1903, via the Bureau of Immigration 
(part of a newly created Department of Commerce and Labor).104 In carrying 
out their duties, “Chinese inspectors” gave content to the abstract idea of due 
process of law, as embodied in the Fifth Amendment. The Amendment, after 
all, spoke of persons, not citizens, meaning that everyone who came into 
contact with government authority arguably fell under its protection.105 An 
open question was what process was due to Chinese immigrants, who sought 
entry into the country for the same familial, political, and economic reasons 
as non-Chinese immigrants, but whom the law now disfavored. 
Historians agree that administrators at the nation’s primary points of entry 
shared the anti-Chinese biases that permeated the West and that they were 
deeply invested in the project of exclusion.106 In general, then, they processed 
admissions cases “with skepticism, expecting the testimony to be 
fraudulent.”107 They questioned applicants and their witnesses extensively, 
with an eye toward prompting and probing inconsistencies.108 An interpreter 
attended the proceedings, but was not always conversant in the applicant’s 
dialect.109 And administrators generally refused to allow applicants’ lawyers or 
friends to be present, lest they “coach[]” the applicant through the process.110 
 
102 The Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58, 59, 61 (1882). 
103 See, e.g., Geary Act, Pub. L. No. 52-60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (providing for the arrest, 
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Immigration Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (extending the exclusionary project 
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“paupers or persons likely to become a public charge”); Scott Act, Pub. L. No. 50-1015, 25 Stat. 476 
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laborers formerly in the United States from returning unless the laborer had a “lawful wife” or family 
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without due process of law . . . .”). 
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After the administrator had made a decision on the case, an attorney was 
allowed to intercede, but days, or even months, might pass in the meantime.111 
These patterns reflect choices about how Chinese immigrants deserved to 
be treated, and these choices were constitutional in nature. Chinese 
immigrants said as much—repeatedly and forcefully. With the help of savvy 
advocates and lawyers, Chinese immigrants filed thousands of habeas corpus 
petitions in the decades after 1882, questioning the legality of exclusion 
policies and demanding that administrative procedures respect applicants’ 
rights under the Constitution.112 Some cases made it all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, resulting in important pronouncements about the rights and 
legal status of immigrants writ large.113 
The regular involvement of courts in this episode of constitutional history 
might make it seem like a poor example of administrative constitutionalism: 
arguably, administrators were simply implementing the courts’ constitutional 
interpretations, and to the extent that administrators innovated, Chinese 
habeas petitioners ensured that the courts checked administrators’ work. Two 
features of this history undermine that argument. First, administrative 
practices shaped how judges engaged with the concept of due process, as well 
as how judges thought about the interpretive stakes. In case after case, 
government lawyers defended the summary procedures that administrators 
used and suggested the devastating implications of greater procedural 
protections.114 Such narratives cast due process not as a sacred Anglo-
American tradition but as a weapon of determined and unscrupulous 
foreigners—a weapon to be carefully guarded.115 
Second, courts were hardly keeping a tight rein over this particular clause 
of the Constitution. Indeed, the gist of the courts’ decisions over time was to 
give immigration officials more interpretive power, not less, at least in 
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decisions involving procedural fairness for non-citizens. In the four decades 
following the inauguration of Chinese exclusion, challenges to admission and 
deportation decisions established that “aliens enjoyed constitutional rights 
only at the sufferance of Congress,” to use historian Lucy Salyer’s words.116 
This followed from the Supreme Court’s finding that Congress possessed 
“plenary power” over immigration—a power that the text of the Constitution 
did not make explicit but that the justices now deemed an essential attribute 
of a sovereign nation. The practical upshot of this finding was that whatever 
vestigial constitutional rights detained immigrants had were left to 
administrators to enforce—or not.117 
The Supreme Court displayed greater caution when it came to Chinese 
admission-seekers who claimed to be citizens, having recognized in previous 
cases that citizens and non-citizens were differently situated vis-à-vis the 
Constitution. But nonetheless the Court initially rejected litigants’ demand 
that judges, rather than agencies, be the ultimate arbiter of the fact of 
citizenship.118 In doing so, the Court also implicitly endorsed administrators’ 
fact-finding procedures—which fell well short of a judicial trial. Where the 
administrator was acting within powers conferred by Congress, Justice 
Holmes explained in the 1905 Ju Toy case, the administrator’s decision “is due 
process of law.”119 It was a bold pronouncement and likely inconsistent with the 
 
116 Id. at 53. 
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that denial of counsel at deportation hearings violated due process). The precise scope of the plenary 
power remains a live question among courts and legal scholars. 
118 See Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263 (citing Nishimura Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting to support holding that 
executive officers were competent to hear citizenship disputes and that even for persons who claimed 
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intentions of the Constitution’s framers, as legal scholar Thomas Reed Powell 
noted in 1907, but the perceived “horde of immigrants on the frontier” provided 
ready justification for a decision that might otherwise appear “monstrous.”120 
The Supreme Court eventually moved away from aspects of the Ju Toy 
decision. In 1908, the Court clarified that a Chinese admission-seeker who 
claimed to be a U.S. citizen was entitled to a fair hearing, albeit a “summary” 
one, and that if immigration authorities provided “nothing but the semblance 
of a hearing,” a federal court could revisit the merits of the case.121 In the 
context of deportation—which courts treated as a much more severe action 
than exclusion—the Court went further. In a 1922 case involving two 
residents who claimed to be China-born sons of native-born citizens, Justice 
Brandeis deemed the fact of citizenship an “essential jurisdictional” one, 
meaning that the petitioners were entitled to a judicial determination of that 
fact, even absent any procedural irregularities below.122 
And yet in other regards, Ju Toy remained “good law”—and remains so 
today, along with many other judicial pronouncements from the Chinese 
exclusion context. The day-to-day administrative practices that informed 
those decisions thus mattered greatly. And as legal historian Lucy Salyer has 
demonstrated, these practices “deviated significantly from the norms of due 
process elaborated in Anglo-American jurisprudence.”123 
As for how, and to whom, that deviation mattered, the effects are clearest 
in the realm of immigration, but not confined to immigrants from China. In 
the decades after the Chinese exclusion era, immigrants of all nationalities 
struggled to establish that the Fifth Amendment required something more 
than what administrators had accorded Chinese litigants at the turn of the 
twentieth century.124 
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Legal scholar Gabriel Chin has extended the argument further, to all 
persons, immigrant and otherwise, who found themselves in conflict with 
an administrative agency. The scant procedural protections that the 
Supreme Court approved in the immigration context set a more general 
“due process threshold” for the administrative state, Chin explains.125 
“[W]hen Congress wants to grant administrators the discretion to work 
without oversight, the constitutional minimum is still set in many respects 
by the Asian Exclusion cases.”126 
Historians hint at still another way in which this episode of administrative 
constitutionalism matters: it affected the worldviews and practices of Chinese 
immigrants who did make it through the gates, even legitimately. In the 
decades after 1882, “Chinese immigrants and residents . . . often lived a 
shadowed existence,” explains historian Erika Lee.127 Aware of their legal 
vulnerabilities, they were “constantly anxious about their immigration status, 
about harassment by immigration officials . . . , and about their personal safety 
in general.”128 
This “psychology of fear” spilled over into the lives of native-born Chinese 
American citizens129—and not without reason. Historian Mae Ngai estimates 
that at least twenty-five percent of the Chinese American population in 1950 
was unlawfully present.130 This itself was a legacy of administrative action, at 
least in part. Faced with hostile immigration inspectors, ever-heightening 
evidentiary standards, and little hope of meaningful judicial review, Chinese 
admission-seekers had turned the immigration bureaucracy’s own procedures 
against it: they drew on evidence supplied in prior successful admission cases 
to craft elaborate, fictitious family histories.131 Between 1920 and 1940, over 
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71,000 Chinese entered the U.S. as China-born sons of American citizens, 
and many of these claims were fraudulent (they were “paper sons”).132 
During the mid-1950s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
helped thousands of Chinese Americans “confess” to their crimes and gain 
legal status, as part of a broader federal government campaign to eliminate 
“paper immigration,” but in doing so, Ngai argues, they “reproduced 
racialized perceptions that all Chinese immigrants were illegal and 
dangerous.”133 This only lent further credence to one of the Chinese 
inspectors’ most important legal interpretations: that although the 
Constitution’s reach extends to all persons within the nation’s jurisdiction, its 
protections may be weakened or denied to those who threaten dominant 
visions of the ideal national community.134   
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM  
AS AN “ARENA OF STRUGGLE” 
The examples in Parts II and III are a sample of what historians have to 
offer the study of administrative constitutionalism. I hope they inspire legal 
scholars to read more deeply in the scholarship that historians have crafted 
from administrative records. I would not want to imply, however, that legal 
scholars can turn to historians for insight into whatever constitutional 
provision captures their interest, or that I chose my examples at random. 
Over the past few generations, historians have been deeply invested in 
understanding what Barbara Welke calls the “borders of belonging”—the 
changing set of meanings ascribed to particular aspects of individual identity, 
such as race, gender, and ability, and the consequences of those meanings for 
individuals’ ability to participate in society.135 Law is intimately related to 
these borders of belonging, for law both shapes meaning and creates 
consequences. In this regard, the Bill of Rights and Reconstruction 
Amendments may be the most important law there is. These amendments 
have long served as a touchstone for marginalized and excluded groups, 
offering them tools for demanding greater freedom and equality. At the same 
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time, these amendments have sometimes functioned to preserve the status 
quo. Invoked by those in power, they have said, “wait your turn,” “don’t take 
mine,” and “trust the system.” Indeed, Welke credits the Supreme Court’s 
“narrow, nugatory interpretation” of the Reconstruction Amendments in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with “thwart[ing] a politics of 
human rights.”136 Agencies are part of that story, too, just as they are part of 
the Court’s resuscitation of those amendments decades later.137 
By asking scholars of administrative constitutionalism to engage more with 
historical work, including on periods preceding the rise of the modern 
administrative state, I am thus taking a particular stance. I am not simply 
offering scholars a means of expanding their archive, but encouraging them to 
expand the archive in a particular way. I am asking for greater attention to 
people on the margins—people who are often the subject of regulation but 
whose voices and concerns are less likely to make it into an agency’s formal 
legal pronouncements or a top administrator’s testimony before Congress. 
And I am asking scholars to consider, as systematically as possible, who has 
reaped the benefits of administrative constitutionalism and who has borne 
the burdens. 
At a time when the concept of administrative governance is highly 
politicized, with some commentators rushing to the defense of the 
administrative state and others attacking it, such a position may seem 
imprudent.138 The work I am asking for might add fuel to this fire, by 
suggesting that administrative interpretations of the Constitution have 
tended to skew in one direction or another. 
But I have my sights on another problem: the prospect of the field of 
administrative constitutionalism replicating administrative law scholarship 
more generally—ever attentive to congressional and judicial constraints on 
agency behavior and, increasingly, to the complexities of day-to-day 
administrative decisionmaking,139 but only obliquely concerned with 
distribution (aside from a general assumption that “agency capture” exists and 
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must be guarded against).140 Here, I mean distribution in the broadest 
sense—of not only material resources, but also opportunity, risk, and power. 
At the end of the day, when we look at the actual work of administrative 
agencies and the way that other legal institutions have (or have not) 
constrained them, who has gotten what? And at what cost? Further, do those 
distributions map onto familiar lines of inclusion and exclusion (race, gender, 
sexuality, ability, national origin, class)?141 In my opinion, too few self-
described scholars of administrative law are asking these critical questions 
(although perhaps times are changing).142 
Scholars of administrative constitutionalism ought to do better, not least 
because of the high political and cultural stakes of decisions involving the 
Constitution.143 “[A] signal feature of American constitutional history,” 
historian Hendrik Hartog wrote in 1987, in a landmark essay, is “the 
passionate insistence of various groups that the Constitution must be (in 
other words, must be made to be) a recognition and an expression of legitimate 
aspirations.”144 According to Hartog, past actors routinely read into the 
Constitution messages that, at the time, looked “subversive and disruptive 
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and utopian.”145 They saw in that document messages about the duty of public 
authorities to destroy structures of hierarchy and oppression; messages about 
the meaning of equality–who was equal to whom, and what that equivalence 
meant; and messages about which rights and freedoms trumped others.146 
Today, some of these once-radical messages are widely accepted as 
constitutional truths. Other messages have never been incorporated into 
constitutional doctrine, but remain alive—vying, still, for recognition. Their 
endurance reminds us that, in any era, constitutional interpretation is “an arena 
of struggle.”147 
As the administrative constitutionalism literature grows and matures, we 
should remember this long American tradition of constitutional struggle. We 
should analyze administrators as not simply interpreters but arbiters—
mediators of contending constitutional visions. We should pay attention to 
whose constitutional aspirations gained legitimacy as they came into contact 
with the administrative state, and whose suffered humiliation and defeat. We 
should investigate what consequences followed. Engagement with historians 
is crucial to this end. 
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